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Abstract—Promising federated learning coupled with Mobile
Edge Computing (MEC) is considered as one of the most
promising solutions to the AI-driven service provision. Plenty
of studies focus on federated learning from the performance and
security aspects, but they neglect the incentive mechanism. In
MEC, edge nodes would not like to voluntarily participate in
learning, and they differ in the provision of multi-dimensional
resources, both of which might deteriorate the performance of
federated learning. Also, lightweight schemes appeal to edge
nodes in MEC. These features require the incentive mechanism to
be well designed for MEC. In this paper, we present an incentive
mechanism FMore with multi-dimensional procurement auction
of K winners. Our proposal FMore not only is lightweight and
incentive compatible, but also encourages more high-quality edge
nodes with low cost to participate in learning and eventually
improve the performance of federated learning. We also present
theoretical results of Nash equilibrium strategy to edge nodes and
employ the expected utility theory to provide guidance to the ag-
gregator. Both extensive simulations and real-world experiments
demonstrate that the proposed scheme can effectively reduce the
training rounds and drastically improve the model accuracy for
challenging AI tasks.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing, multi-dimensional auc-
tion, federated learning, incentive mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) [1], [2], considered as a
promising architecture for future networks, enables edge nodes
to locally collect and process various data with the remote
cloud coordination, which especially appeals to the Internet of
Things (IoT), social networking, 5G, etc. In these scenarios,
huge amounts of data are generated and further employed
by machine learning to provide AI-driven services, such as
classification, recommendation, and prediction. However, the
proliferation of data will gradually phase-out the traditional
paradigm of centrally processing all the data at a remote cloud.
Fortunately, edge nodes equipped with powerful computing
capability, sufficient Flash storage, etc., accelerate the adoption
of local data processing. Recent studies have shown that more
than 90% of data will be stored and processed locally in the
near future [3]. The salient features of MEC attract not only
researchers but also investors from the capital market. An
analyst from Goldman Sachs believes that MEC will change
the world we live in [4].
MEC might also boost the widespread use of federated
learning. Federated learning [5], an emerging division of ma-
chine learning, allows collaboratively training a shared model
with distributed data, without the need for centralized storage
at a cloud. Moreover, federated learning endeavors to address
the privacy issue of users who would hesitate to upload their
private data to a remote cloud. These two prominent features
fascinate the industry. Google applies federated learning to
the AI-enabled application Gboard for mobile users [6], and
the open-source framework FATE of federated learning was
published by WeBank in April 2019. Some other instances
include FedVision, emoji prediction [7], anti-money launder-
ing with multiple banks [8], etc. Finally, federated learning
coupled with MEC is considered as one of the most promising
solutions to the AI-driven service provision.
A plethora of studies concentrate on federated learning [9],
[10], which has already become a hot topic in both academia
and industry in recent years. Starting from the impressive work
in [5], researchers focus on the performance improvement of
federated learning [11], [12]. They studied the comparison of
synchronous and asynchronous aggregations [13], the com-
pression of information exchanged in the global aggregation
[14], [15], the control algorithm to trade off local updates and
global aggregations [16], etc. The security and privacy issue
of federated learning is another popular topic [17], [18]. For
example, the chained anomaly detection scheme [19], secure
global aggregation algorithms [20], and the privacy-preserving
mechanism [21] have been proposed in the past two years.
In these studies, a critical and optimistic assumption is that
voluntary participation of local node is required, without any
returns, which does not hold in realistic scenarios of MEC.
The incentive mechanism is essential and crucial to feder-
ated learning in MEC. Since learning operations at edge nodes
will consume various resources, such as battery, bandwidth,
and computation power, rational edge nodes would not like to
get involved in this voluntary collaboration, without any com-
pensation [22]. Moreover, although federated learning does
not need edge nodes to upload their raw data to the remote
cloud for the privacy concern, smart malicious attackers may
still infer the source information from model parameters [23].
Some potential threats aggravate the reluctance of participation
for edge nodes. For service providers, the performance of
federated learning is negatively impacted, without sufficient
participation of high-quality nodes [24]. In sum, the incentive
mechanism is indispensable for federated learning.
Unfortunately, previous incentive mechanisms in other sce-
narios cannot be directly applied to federated learning in MEC.
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Most importantly, there exists a widening resource gap be-
tween different edge nodes [3], and this gap might deteriorate
the performance of federated learning. Consequently, the pro-
posed incentive scheme should encourage more participation
of high-quality nodes and choose them to eventually improve
the performance of federated learning. Furthermore, resources
provided by edge nodes are multi-dimensional and dynamic,
and K edge nodes are selected in each game. Besides, the
proposed scheme should not introduce much computational
cost and communication overhead since these resources are
constrained at some nodes. In short, these prominent features
should be considered seriously in the design of incentive
mechanism in MEC.
In this paper, we study the incentive problem to motivate
more high-quality edge nodes with low cost to participate in
collaborative learning and eventually improve the performance
of federated learning in MEC. To achieve this goal, we bor-
row and extend the model of multi-dimensional procurement
auction proposed by Che in [25]. The aggregator broad-
casts bid asks with the selection criteria before participators
separately submit bids containing resource qualities and the
expected payment. Then, the aggregator chooses K(K ≥ 1)
winners according to the sorted scores. We provide each
node with a unique Nash equilibrium strategy to maximize
the expected profit, and give guidance to the aggregator to
obtain the expected resources, both of which are among the
most challenging tasks in the design of incentive scheme. To
demonstrate the performance of our proposal, we implement
a smart simulator and test with multiple datasets and learning
models. We also deploy a real system with 32 nodes.
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold.
1) We present a multi-dimensional incentive framework
FMore for federated learning. FMore covers a series of
scoring functions and is Pareto efficient for some specific
cases. It uses game theory to derive optimal strategies for
the edge participators, and leverages the expected utility
theory to guide the aggregator to effectively obtain the
desired resources.
2) The proposed scheme is lightweight and Incentive Com-
patible (IC). The computational overhead and commu-
nication costs are negligible in the realistic deployment,
and IC indicates that it is useless for edge nodes to
declare false qualities in FMore.
3) The results of extensive simulations show that FMore
is able to speed up federated training via reducing
training rounds by 51.3% on average and improve the
model accuracy by 28% for the tested CNN and LSTM
models. Real implementations with 31 edge nodes and
one aggregator also witness the improvement of model
accuracy by 44.9% and the reduction of training time
by 38.4%.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model and some preliminaries. In Sec-
tion III, we present the proposed incentive scheme FMore with
the multi-dimensional auction, followed by some theoretical
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Fig. 1. The system model of mobile edge computing
results in Section IV. Extensive performance evaluations are
presented in Section V. Section VI surveys related work, and
Section VII concludes the whole paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
In this paper, we consider a typical MEC network, where
edge nodes such as micro servers, home gateways, laptops,
and sensors, are connected to a remote cloud. The number of
potential edge nodes is large, and various resources of each
node are dynamic. Edge nodes have constrained resources for
federated learning since they have other important tasks. In
Fig. 1, an aggregator exists in the remote cloud to orchestrate
federated learning with distributed edge nodes. To obtain a
well-trained global model, the aggregator has motivations to
pay for the recruited edge nodes. Edge nodes demonstrate no
intention to upload their private data to the remote cloud,
and would not like to offer their dynamic resources to the
aggregator unless they are paid for their contributions. Both the
aggregator and edge nodes are assumed to obey the contracts
they negotiate, and edge nodes are also assumed to be trustable
that they will provide what they bid. Many techniques such
as blacklist can be applied to the defaulter. Similar to [25],
[26], we also adopt the independent private value model for
edge nodes (sellers) and aggregator (buyer). Finally, some
threats, e.g. collusion attacks and false name attacks, are not
considered in this paper. In Table I, we summarize some
notations frequently used through this paper.
B. Preliminaries
Federated learning is designed to train a shared global model
that minimizes the global loss function F (w) in a cooperative
and distributed manner [5]. Formally, the goal of federated
learning is to find model parameters w∗, which satisfy
w∗ = arg min F (w). (1)
Typically, the training process takes a number of rounds to
converge. In each round, the aggregator randomly chooses
K nodes from all the N edge nodes, and then distributes
the global parameter w(t), where t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 is the
iteration index, to those selected nodes. Based on the global
TABLE I
THE NOTATIONS FREQUENTLY USED IN THIS PAPER
Notation Description
N,K total number of edge nodes and size of winner set
m number of resource types
W,N winner set and edge node set
qij quality of jth resource of user i
qi quality vector of user i
qˆi declared quality of ith resource
pi payment of user i
θi private cost parameter of user i
F (θi) cumulative distribution function of θi
f(θi) probability density function of θi
S(·) scoring function given by the aggregator
c(·) cost function
pii(·), V (·) profit functions of user i and the aggregator
U(·) utility function of the aggregator
tnei Nash equilibrium strategy of node i
tne−i Nash equilibrium strategies except node i
ψ probability of edge node being selected
[K] auction with K winners
parameter w(t), the chosen node trains the shared model with
its local data, i.e.,
wi(t+ 1) = w(t)− η∇Fi(wi(t)), (2)
where the parameter η is the step size. After the local training,
these nodes upload their model parameters to the aggregator,
and the aggregator generates global parameters of t+ 1 as
w(t+ 1) =
∑N
i=1Diwi(t+ 1)∑N
i=1Di
, (3)
where Di is the data size of node i. Then, the aggregator will
initialize the next round of training by randomly choosing K
nodes. When the accuracy of global model satisfies the require-
ment or the training time exceeds the predefined threshold, this
training process terminates. Briefly, federated learning consists
of many iterations of global aggregation and local training in
Fig. 2(a). Also, model accuracy and training rounds are two
critical performance metrics. Finally, we should mention that
our proposed scheme can be applied to this classic federated
learning [5] as well as other paradigms [27].
III. FMORE: THE PROPOSED INCENTIVE SCHEME
In this section, we present the incentive mechanism FMore
based on the multi-dimensional procurement auction and detail
the design rationale for each step in FMore. To explicitly illus-
trate our proposal, we also describe a walk-through example
with five edge nodes. Further discussions are provided for
specific scenarios as well.
A. The Description of FMore
The proposed incentive framework FMore consists of six
steps, i.e., bid ask, bid collection, winner determination, task
assignment, local training, and global aggregation, in each
round of training, as shown in Fig. 2(b). The latter three steps
are similar to the classic federated learning in [5] (referred
to as RandFL). The computational cost and communication
overhead are only introduced in the former three steps, which
should be considered seriously in the design of FMore.
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Fig. 2. The procedure of RandFL and FMore
(1) Bid Ask: In each round of federated learning, the
aggregator initially broadcasts a scoring rule S(q1, · · · , qm, p),
where q = (q1, · · · , qm) is the quality vector of resources, and
p is the expected payment that the edge node bids with the
provision of q. The resources considered in FMore include
local data, computation capability, bandwidth, CPU cycle, etc.
In addition, the aggregator leverages the scoring function to
choose participators. We formulate S(qi, pi) as a quasi-linear
function
S(qi1, qi2, · · · , qim, pi) = s(qi1, qi2, · · · , qim)− pi, (4)
where subscript i = 1, 2, · · · , N is the node index. Comparing
with the size of model parameters, we can neglect communica-
tion overhead in this step. This is because only a score function
and simple requirements are delivered from the aggregator to
edge nodes, and the corresponding data size is just a few bytes.
Many scoring functions can be included in FMore. For
instance, s(·) can be set as the utility function U(q1, · · · , qm)
of the aggregator. Some classic utility functions include the
perfect substitution utility function, the perfect complementary
function, and the general Cobb-Douglas function, which are
separately denoted as
s(·) = α1q1 + · · ·+ αmqm,
s(·) = min{α1q1, · · · , αmqm},
s(·) = qα11 qα22 · · · qαmm ,
where α1, · · · , αm are coefficients. We may add the constraint∑
αi = 1, but it is not imperative. In the above functions,
the additive form is preferred to perfect substitution resources
such as GPU and CPU, while the perfect complementary form
might be the best choice for scenarios where both bandwidth
and computing power are considered simultaneously.
(2) Bid Collection: When edge nodes receive a bid ask with
scoring function S(·), they separately base on their available
resources to decide whether to bid or not. According to the
private value model in [22], edge node i has a private cost
parameter θi, and then it can get the private cost function
c(q1, · · · , qm, θi). Note that the cost function c(·) is an increas-
ing function of qi. In this paper, we assume single crossing
conditions cqq ≥ 0, cqθ > 0, and cqqθ ≥ 0, which mean the
marginal cost increases with the parameter θ. Before bidding,
each node learns its private cost parameter θ and gets the Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (CDF) F (θ) from the historical
data. It is assumed that θi is independently and identically
distributed over the range of [θ, θ] (0 < θ < θ < ∞). There
also exists a positive and continuously differentiable density
function f(θ).
How much to bid? As a rational edge node, node i needs
to choose qi and pi to maximize the following profit function
pii(q1, · · · , qm, pi) = pi − c(q1, · · · , qm, θi). (5)
In this optimization problem, one of the constraints is Indi-
vidual Rationality (IR), which implies that any node will not
participate in federated learning when its profit is negative. In
other words, pii(qi, pi) ≥ 0. Let pii(qi, pi) = 0 denote that
node i will not join in the training. In the next section, we
will present the theoretical results of optimal strategy for each
edge node to compete with others.
When edge node i submits its bid (qi, pi) to the aggregator,
the technique of sealed-bid auction is adopted, indicating that
this bid is only known to the aggregator and node i. The
sealed-bid auction is quite suitable for network scenarios and
can be easily implemented by FMore.
(3) Winner Determination: When the aggregator collects
sufficient bids or the timer with a predefined threshold expires,
the aggregator finishes the bid collection process. Then, it
starts to determine the winners. In this paper, we extend the
classic multi-dimensional auction to multiple winners. In the
winner determination, the aggregator has to maximize the
profit function V (·) as
V =
∑
i∈W
(U(qi1, qi2, · · · , qim)− pi), (6)
where W is the winner set, and U(·) is the utility function
of q = (q1, q2, · · · , qm). Similar to the literature [25], we
also assume that U ′(·) ≥ 0, U ′′(·) < 0, limq=0 U ′(q) = ∞,
and limq=∞ U ′′(q) = 0. Moreover, the constraint of IR, i.e.,
V ≥ 0, should be satisfied for the rational aggregator as well.
In FMore, the aggregator chooses K edge nodes with the
best scores to construct the winner set W. The parameter K is
decided by the aggregator and can be estimated with historical
data. Besides the winner determination, the aggregator has to
perform the payment allocation. Both the first-price auction
and the second-price auction can be applied to FMore. We
use the first-price auction for simplicity in this paper.
(4) Task Assignment, Local Training and Global Aggre-
gation: The last three steps are similar to the classic federated
learning RandFL, where winners locally train the model with
declared resources, according to Eq. (2). After finishing local
updates, they submit the result of model parameters to the
aggregator and then obtain the corresponding payment. If any
edge node does not comply with the contract, it will be put
into the blacklist by the aggregator.
The pseudocode of FMore is given in Algorithm 1. Com-
pared with RandFL, our scheme FMore just adds one round of
information exchange between edge nodes and the aggregator,
and the total communication cost is a linear function of N . The
Algorithm 1: Incentive Federated Learning Algorithm FMore
Input: nodes set N = {1, 2, ..., N}, local data size D1, D2, ..., DN
Output: global model parameter w(t)
1 t = 0;
2 Set parameters of all edge nodes wi(0) = w(0);
3 for t = 1, 2, ..., T do
4 The aggregator sends scoring rule S(q, p) to all the nodes;
5 for node i ∈ N in parallel do
6 Node i computes its q as Eq. (7) ;
7 Node i obtains its p using Euler’s method;
8 Node i submits bid (qi, pi) to the aggregator;
9 end
10 The aggregator computes S(qi, pi) and sorts all the scores;
11 W← K nodes with the top K scores;
12 for node i ∈W in parallel do
13 The aggregator sends payment pi and global w(t) to node i;
14 Node i trains wi(t+ 1) with Di according to Eq. (2);
15 Node i sends wi(t+ 1) to the aggregator;
16 end
17 The aggregator computes w(t+ 1) according to Eq. (3);
18 end
1
computational cost contains the calculation of optimal strategy
at each edge node and the sorting operation at the aggregator.
The time complexity of optimal strategy computation is linear,
which can be found in Section IV. Thus, our proposed scheme
is lightweight, which is much more appropriate for MEC.
B. A Walk-Through Example
In Fig. 3, we present a walk-through example with five
edge nodes N = {A,B,C,D,E} and consider two types of
resources, i.e., training data and bandwidth. The data size
and bandwidth are separately over the range of [1000, 5000]
and [5Mb, 100Mb]. The public scoring function is set as
S(q, p) = min{α1q1, α2q2} − p, where coefficients α1 and
α2 are to balance different types of resources and both set to
0.5. In addition, q1, q2, and p are normalized by the technique
of min-max normalization to compute the scores for simplicity.
It should be noted that the strategy for each node might not
be optimal in this example, and we will provide the Nash
equilibrium strategy to a rational node in Section IV.
In the first round of training, these five edge nodes in-
dividually submit the bids (q1, q2, p) as (4000, 85Mb, 0.20),
(3000, 35Mb, 0.10), (3500, 75Mb, 0.18), (5000, 85Mb, 0.20),
and (5000, 100Mb, 0.20). After collecting all the bids, the
aggregator computes the scores, sorts them in the descending
order, and chooses three winners (K = 3 andW = {A,D,E})
with top three scores. The payments for winners are 0.175,
0.221, and 0.300 in the first-price auction. The aggregator
distributes the global parameters to these three winners for
their local learnings. When winners finish local trainings, the
aggregator performs the global aggregation as Eq. (3) and then
terminates this round of training.
In the second round, these nodes might change their bids as
(4000, 85Mb, 0.16), (3500, 45Mb, 0.1), (4000, 80Mb, 0.15),
(4000, 80Mb, 0.2), and (5000, 100Mb, 0.3). We take node C
as an example to illustrate the dynamic provision of resources.
The reasons why node C changes its bid include but not limit
to: (1) the available resources are changed; (2) the private cost
parameter θ is reestimated and revised; and (3) node C trades
A B C D E
Aggregator
Bid (q1, q2, p)
       Score         p
   C       0.225       0.15
   A       0.215       0.16
   E       0.200       0.30
   D       0.175       0.20
   B       0.111       0.10
√ 
√
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       Score         p
   E       0.300       0.20
   D       0.221       0.20
   A       0.175       0.20
   C       0.133       0.18
   B       0.058       0.10
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Fig. 3. The example of FMore with five nodes
revenue for others such as reputation. Any unknown reason
leads to that node C submits the bid as (4000, 80Mb, 0.15)
and it is ranked as the first this time. The selection of winners
is similar to the last round, and the set W = {A,C,E}
is constructed. These three nodes are responsible for local
training in this round, and payments are 0.16, 0.15, and 0.3 in
the first-price auction. Similarly, we perform the processes of
bid ask, bid collection, winner determination, task assignment,
local training, and global aggregation iteratively until the
model accuracy satisfies the requirement.
C. Discussion
In MEC, the resource provision is dynamic and distinct,
and there exist some nodes that have sufficient local data with
high quality. However, the situation is changed in some other
scenarios where the resources of participators are relatively
stable and the local data size is tremendously small for each
node. In such catastrophic cases, selecting fixed nodes with
limited data and inferior-quality resources may negatively
affect the performance of federated learning. For instance,
the overfitting problem is frequently encountered in such
scenarios. To tackle these problems, we extend FMore for
widespread application.
In the winner determination phase of FMore, K top-score
nodes are definitely added to the winner set. Now, we revise
this step as follows: nodes in the descending order of scores
will be individually added to the winner set W with probability
ψ until K nodes are chosen in the set W. This can be achieved
by changing Line 11 of Algorithm 1. We name this extension
as ψ-FMore, and FMore is a special case of ψ-FMore with
ψ = 1. In ψ-FMore, we can construct the winner set W of K
nodes with probability Pr(ψ) =
∑N−K
i=0 C
i
i+K(1−ψ)iψK . It
can be easily verified that the probability Pr(ψ) approaches
to one with many appropriate parameters. In addition, the
parameter ψ should be carefully set to balance the model
accuracy and the training speed in extreme scenarios, since
small ψ might deteriorate FMore into the classic federated
learning RandFL. In Section V, we demonstrate the impacts
of parameter ψ on the performance of federated learning.
IV. OPTIMAL STRATEGY AND UTILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze Nash equilibrium strategies
for edge nodes and present closed-form theoretical results. The
impacts of parameters N and K are also studied here. Then,
we provide guidance to the aggregator to get the expected
resources. Finally, we also prove that FMore is Pareto efficient
and IC.
In FMore, it is the key to discover the Nash equilibrium
strategy for an edge node. The Nash equilibrium strategy tnei
indicates that it is the optimal choice for node i, no matter what
strategies other players choose. We present the definition of
Nash Equilibrium in our auction as follows:
Definition 1. Nash Equilibrium: The strategy set of all the
participators (tne1 , t
ne
2 , · · · , tneN ) is a Nash Equilibrium, if any
edge node i has
pii(t
ne
i , t
ne
−i) ≥ pii(ti, tne−i), ti ≥ 0,
where tne−i = (t
ne
1 , · · · , tnei−1, tnei+1, · · · , tneN ), and ti ∈ Si is any
of the strategies for node i.
The Nash equilibrium strategy tnei for edge node i consists
of two components, i.e., the qualities of resources and the
expected payment. For the former part, Che’s Theorem 1 has
already found that the choice of quality is only relevant to
the private cost parameter θ. In other words, Che’s Theorem 1
shows that quality can be independently chosen. Then, we
provide the unique Nash equilibrium strategy in the one-
winner game in Che’s Theorem 2 and extend the theoretical
results to the two-winners game in Proposition 1. Since the
proofs of Che’s Theorem 1 and Che’s Theorem 2 can be
referred to in [25], we omit here for space limitation. We also
omit the subscript i in the following analysis for simplicity.
Che’s Theorem 1. In the first-price auction with K(K ≥ 1)
winners, the quality of resource is chosen at qs(θ) for all θ ∈
[θ, θ], where qs(θ) = arg max s(q)− c(q, θ).
Che’s Theorem 2. The unique Nash equilibrium strategy
tne(θ) = (qs(θ), ps(θ)) for each node in the first-price auction
with one winner is given as
qs(θ) = arg max s(q)− c(q, θ)
ps(θ) = c(qs, θ) +
∫ θ
θ
cθ(qs(t), t)
(
1− F (t)
1− F (θ)
)N−1
dt
Proposition 1. The unique Nash equilibrium for each node in
the first-price auction with two winners can be denoted as
qs(θ) = arg max s(q)− c(q, θ)
ps(θ) = c(qs, θ) +
∫ θ
θ
cθ(qs(t), t)
(
1− F (t)
1− F (θ)
)N−2
dt
The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to Che’s Theorem 2.
The only difference is that the probability Pr{win|S(q(θ), p)}
is computed as the sum of winning probability with the first
score and winning probability with the second score. Interested
readers can refer to [25] for details.
Theorem 1. The unique Nash equilibrium of each node in the
first-price auction with K winners can be denoted as
qs(θ) = arg max s(q)− c(q, θ), (7)
ps(θ) = c(qs, θ) +
∫ u
0
(
g(x)
g(u)
)
dx, (8)
g(u) =
M∑
i=1
[1−H(u)]i−1[H(u)]N−i, (9)
u(θ) = s(q(θ))− c(q(θ), θ). (10)
Proof. The expected profit pi(·) of edge node is denoted as
pi(q, p|θ) = (p− c(q(θ), θ))Pr{win|S(q(θ), p)}. (11)
We define the maximum score u = X(θ) and u0 as
u = s(q(θ))− c(q(θ), θ),
u0 = s(qs(θ))− c(qs(θ), θ).
Since the CDF of θ is F (θ), we can use the Envelope theorem
to get the CDF of X(θ) as H(x) = 1−F (X−1(x)). We also
define b(u) = b(X(θ)) = S(q(θ), p). Then, the expected profit
pi(q, p|θ) can be represented by
pi(q, p|θ) = (u0 − b(u))g(u),
g(u) = g(θ) = Pr{win|X(θ)}
=
K∑
i=1
[1−H(X(θ))]i−1[H(X(θ))]N−i
=
K∑
i=1
[1−H(u)]i−1[H(u)]N−i
To get the maximum pi(q, p|θ), we have
∂pi
∂u
= −b′(u)g(u) + (u0 − b(u))g′(u),
and ∂pi∂u |u=u0 = 0. Define ϕ(u) = g
′(u)
g(u) . Then, we can easily
get the first order linear differential equation
b′(u0) + ϕ(u0)b(u0) = u0ϕ(u0). (12)
We can solve this equation to get a unique b(u) with the initial
condition b(0) = 0. Then, we can get
b(u) = u−
∫ u
0
(
g(x)
g(u)
)
dx.
Since the quality ps(θ) − c(qs, θ) = u − b(u) holds at the
equilibrium point, we can get the equilibrium ps(θ) as
ps(θ) = c(qs, θ) +
∫ u
0
(
g(x)
g(u)
)
dx.
Thus, we obtain the conclusion.
It should be noted that the closed-form of ps(θ) is extremely
complicated. We can use classic numerical methods, e.g., the
Euler method and the Runge-Kutte method, to get the result
of ps(θ). Here, the Euler method can be described as
dy
dx
= f(x, y), (13)
yn+1 = yn + f(xn, yn)h, (14)
where h is the step size. Eq. (12) can be represented like Eq.
(13). Then, we can get ps(θ) with the complexity of linear
time.
Theorem 2. In a game with K winners, the expected profit of
edge node pi(q, p|θ) is a decreasing function of the total node
number N .
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 1, we can easily have
∂pi
∂N
= pi(q, p|θ)lnH(X(θ)) ≤ 0.
Since CDF H(·) ≤ 1, we can have that the profit function
pi(·) is a decreasing function of N , when θ 6= θ.
Theorem 2 conforms to the fact that when more edge nodes
join in the game, the competition becomes more severe, and
the profit for each node is correspondingly reduced. Hence,
the increase of N will benefit the aggregator, which is the
reason why the incentive mechanism is significant. Next, we
will demonstrate that the profit of the participator is increased
by the design of multiple winners as well.
Theorem 3. In a game with N nodes, the expected profit of
each edge node pi(q, p|θ) is an increasing function of winner
number K.
Proof. The equilibrium strategies for Kth and (K+1)th win-
ner are separately denoted as (pne[K], q
ne
[K]) and (p
ne
[K+1], q
ne
[K+1]).
We also use pi[K+1](·) to denote the profit in the game having
(K + 1) winners. Then, we have
pi[K+1](q
ne
[K], p
ne
[K]|θ)− pi[K](qne[K], pne[K]|θ)
= (pne[K] − c(qne[K], θ))(1−H(X(θ)))K(H(X(θ)))N−K−1
It can be seen that
pi[K+1](q
ne
[K], p
ne
[K]|θ)− pi[K](qne[K], pne[K]|θ) > 0.
Since the strategy (pne[K], q
ne
[K]) might not be the Nash equilib-
rium strategy for the game with (K + 1) winners, we have
pi[K+1](q
ne
[K+1], p
ne
[K+1]|θ) ≥ pi[K+1](qne[K], pne[K]|θ)
Thus, we can get that pi[K+1](·) ≥ pi[K](·) and pi(·) is an
increasing function of K.
Proposition 2. Suppose that all the participators have the
same private value θ and we must select K winners from N
nodes, then adding probability ψ to each node will not impact
its winning probability.
It is an ideal model assumption in Proposition 2, the proof
of which is given in Appendix A. In realistic scenarios,
the private value θ is not identical for most nodes. For the
node selected by FMore with high probability, ψ-FMore will
negatively impact its winning probability. On the contrary, the
winning probability of a low-score node will be improved by
our ψ-FMore. More nodes are involved by ψ-FMore, and the
critical parameter ψ should be carefully chosen. In sum, ψ-
FMore improves the performance of federated learning due to
the increased data diversity in extreme cases.
Proposition 3. In a game with multi-dimensional resources
and K winners, the choice of (q1, · · · , qm) is independent
with p. The quality can be separately computed according to
Che’s Theorem 1.
For multi-dimensional resources, the quality combination is
computed by maximizing s(q1, · · · , qm) − c(q1, · · · , qm, θ),
and the result contains a set of quality combinations. The
proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix B. For the
aggregator, it can set the weight of qi in the function s(·) to
get what it needs. In the following proposition, we will provide
guidance to the aggregator to get the expected resources in an
efficient market.
Proposition 4. When we consider the general Cobb-Douglas
utility function s(·) =∏mi=1 qαii and the additive cost function
c(·) = θ(∑mi=1 βiqi), where ∑mi=1 αi = 1 and ∑mi=1 βi = 1,
the aggregator can adjust the parameters (α1, · · · , αm) to get
different proportion of resources. That is
q∗i
q∗j
=
αi
αj
· β˜j
β˜i
,
where β˜i is the estimation of cost coefficient for qi according
to the historical data in the public and efficient market.
Proposition 4 can be proved with the expected utility theory
that the general Cobb-Douglas utility function is maximized
with the cost constraint. The proof is given in Appendix C. In
this way, the aggregator is able to get the expected resources
from a macro view.
Theorem 4. When the utility function U(·) of the aggregator
is equal to s(·) and has the additive form, our proposed FMore
is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Pareto efficiency is equivalent to that the social surplus
is maximized. The social surplus SS is given as
SS = U(q1, · · · , qm)−
∑
i∈W
c(qi1, · · · , qim, θi)
=
∑
i∈W
(
s(qi1, · · · , qim)− c(qi1, · · · , qim, θi)
)
Since the quality of each winner is chosen as (q1, · · · , qm) =
arg max s(q1, · · · , qm) − c(q1, · · · , qm, θ), we can directly
arrive at the conclusion.
Theorem 5. FMore is Incentive Compatible (IC).
Proof. The payment p is computed by maximizing the ex-
pected profit in Eq. (11) with the combination of qual-
ity (q1, · · · , qm), and the corresponding score is S0 =
s(q1, · · · , qm) − p. If a node declares the malicious quality
{(qˆ1, · · · , qˆm)|∃j, qˆj < qj} and payment p, we can have
s(q1, · · · , qm)− c(q1, · · · , qm, θ) >
s(qˆ1, · · · , qˆm)− c(q1, · · · , qm, θ).
We can find S(q1, · · · , qm) > S(qˆ1, · · · , qˆm), which indicates
that the declared malicious quality will negatively impact the
winning probability. Thus, FMore is IC.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of FMore
via both simulations and real-world experiments. A smart
simulator is developed to comprehensively analyze the per-
formance with a large number of edge nodes, while we also
present the performance improvement with dynamic multi-
dimensional resources in a realistic scenario.
A. Setup
We design a smart simulator based on Tensorflow to study
the performance of FMore. In this simulator, we consider
four classic datasets, i.e., MNIST (referred to as MNIST-O),
Fashion MNIST (referred to as MNIST-F), CIFAR-10, and
news category dataset (referred to as HPNews). The former
three are collections of pictures. For instance, CIFAR-10
contains 60,000 color images of 10 different types of objects.
The last news category dataset HPNews is a collection of
200,000 news headlines of HuffPost from 2012 to 2018. The
underlying models include two CNNs (one1 for MNIST-O and
MNIST-F, the other2 for CIFAR-10) and LSTM. Similar to
[5], non-IID data distribution of sample data is studied across
different edge nodes. FMore, the classic federated learning
(referred to as RandFL), and federated learning with fixed node
selection (referred to as FixedFL) are all implemented here.
Our simulator consists of one aggregator and 100 participa-
tors (N = 100). In each round of training, K = 20 winners
are selected to join in the cooperative training. The resources
considered in the simulator are two-dimensional, i.e., data size
q1 and data category q2. The participator computes the Nash
equilibrium strategy via the Euler method. For the aggregator,
the score function is S(q1, q2, p) = s(q1, q2)−p = αq1q2−p,
where q1 is set to the data size, q2 is the proportion of
data category over the range of (0, 1], and the coefficient α
is set to 25. The determination of winners is based on the
first-score sealed auction. Ties are resolved by the flip of a
coin. The default parameters are adopted throughout the entire
simulations unless explicitly specified.
We also implement FMore in a realistic HPC Cluster with
one aggregator and 31 nodes. The specifications of these 32
nodes include Intel Core i7 CPU, 8GB DDR, 1T HDD+256G
SSD, 1Gbps Ethernet, and Linux Ubuntu 18.04 OS. All these
nodes are connected by a switch. The resources considered
here include computing power, bandwidth, and data size. The
scoring function is S(q1, q2, q3, p) = α1q1+α2q2+α3q3− p,
where the coefficients q1, q2, and q3 are separately set as 0.4,
0.3, 0.3 for computing power, bandwidth and data size. The
computing power is tuned by the number of CPU cores in
the experiments. The data size is allocated over the range of
[2000, 10000] for the accuracy test. Nodes randomly choose
1The CNN for MNIST has 8 layers with the following structure: 3×3×32
Convolutional→ 3×3×64 Convolutional→ 2×2 MaxPool→ Dropout→
Flatten → 1× 128 Full connected → Dropout → 128× 10 Fully connected
→ Softmax. This configuration is similar to the model in [5].
2The CNN for CIFAR-10 has 11 layers with the following structure: 3×3×
32 Convolutional→ Dropout→ 2×2 MaxPool→ 3×3×64 Convolutional
→ Dropout → 2 × 2 MaxPool → Flatten → Dropout → 1 × 1024 Full
connected → Dropout → 1024× 10 Fully connected → Softmax.
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Fig. 7. The accuracy and loss for LSTM with HPNews
different quantities of resources in each round of training.
All the results are the average of five experiments for both
simulations and real-world experiments in this section.
B. Simulations
The goals of FMore include motivating more nodes with
high quality and low cost to participate in cooperative feder-
ated learning and improving the performance of global model.
In essence, performance improvement is our final goal for
federated learning. Here, we mainly discuss the results for the
performance improvement of FMore from a variety of aspects.
(1) Model Accuracy and Loss: From Fig. 4 to Fig. 7, we
can see that the model accuracy of FMore is larger than those
of RandFL and FixFL after 20 rounds of training. When the
underlying model is complicated or the training task is chal-
lenging, the accuracy gap between FMore and the other two is
large, since training CIFAR-10 and HPnews needs more data
with high quality and low cost. At the 20th round of learning
in LSTM, the accuracy of FMore is 60.4%, while FixFL is
only 40.6%. Another contribution is that FMore accelerates
the training speed by 50% for MNIST-O (accuracy 95%), 42%
for MNIST-F (accuracy 84%), 45% for CIFAR-10 (accuracy
50%), and 68% for HPNews (accuracy 46%), comparing with
RandFL. The performance improvement is attributed to the
selection of high-quality nodes, as shown in Fig. 8. Finally, the
speedup of training especially benefits the aggregator, when
the total payment of aggregator is constrained, or nodes would
hesitate to participate in the training for a long time.
(2) The Impacts of Parameter N : The increasing number
of N will improve data diversity and offer more opportunities
for the aggregator to select nodes with high-quality resources
and low cost, which in turn improves the accuracy and training
speed. In Fig. 9, the number of training round is reduced by
28% to get the accuracy of 84%, comparing N = 50 with
N = 100. In each round, the accuracy with N = 100 is larger
than that with N = 50. When N is large enough and 10%
nodes are selected from all the nodes, the improvement of
model accuracy is constrained. For N = 200, data diversity
is already satisfied. Moreover, the increase of N reduces the
payment p for each node, which also benefits the aggregator.
(3) The Impacts of Parameter K: The large parameter
K reduces scores of winners since each node has more
opportunities to be chosen. From Fig. 10(b), we can find that
the payment is increased as well, which conforms to Theorem
3. On the other hand, the large K will feed the model with
more data, which might benefit the model accuracy. In Fig.
10(a), to get the accuracy of 86%, 20 rounds of training are
required for K = 5, while 15 rounds are enough for K = 25.
It can be seen that the large K speeds up the training process.
When K is too large, the margin profit of training speed is
limited. The training results for K = 30 and K = 35 are
similar in our simulations.
(4) The Impacts of Parameter ψ: We also use the param-
eter ψ to increase data diversity in some extreme scenarios. In
Fig. 11(b), we can find that the winner scores with ψ = 0.2
are more scattered than that with ψ = 0.9. When ψ = 0.8,
almost 66.6% nodes selected by ψ-FMore are among top 30
scores. When ψ = 0.2, ψ-FMore approaches to RandFL.
Moreover, ψ-FMore performs better than FMore in small-data-
size scenarios which require more data diversity for federated
learning. Note that the increase of data diversity prevents the
overfitting problem but sacrifices the speed of learning, shown
in Fig. 11(a). When ψ = 0.3, the accuracy only achieves 85%,
which can be achieved at the 11th round with ψ = 0.9.
C. Real-world Experiments
In the realistic deployment, the performance improvement
of FMore includes two aspects, i.e., the accuracy improvement
and the reduction of training time. From Fig. 12, we can
find that the model accuracy is 59.9% for CIFAR-10 after
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Fig. 10. The training speed and payment with parameter K
the 20th round of training in FMore. FMore increases the
accuracy by 44.9%, comparing with RandFL. Similar accuracy
improvement is shown in the LSTM model as well. In addition,
there exist some accuracy jitters in RandFL. For the reduction
of training time, FMore outperforms RandFL as well, as shown
in Fig. 13. The total training time of 20 rounds is 1119.3s
for CIFAR-10 in FMore, which reduces the training time
by 38.4%. To achieve the accuracy of 50% for CIFAR-10,
RandFL needs almost 17 rounds (1552.7s), while FMore only
requires 8 rounds (427.7s). The advantages of FMore become
increasingly prominent when we collaboratively training chal-
lenging AI tasks.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Mobile Edge Computing
MEC has drawn increasing attention in recent years [1].
Most of the studies focus on service placement [2], [11],
[28], task scheduling [29], deployment issues [30], [31], etc.
Among these studies, Wang firstly considered the performance
issue of federated learning in MEC systems, and proposed an
efficient control algorithm that trades off local updates and
global aggregation to minimize the loss function with the
constraint of resources [16]. Another interesting work is given
in [32], where both deep reinforcement learning and federated
learning are employed to optimize edge computing, caching
and communication in MEC.
B. Federated Learning
Federated learning, firstly proposed by McMahan in [5], has
become a fascinating topic in the machine learning community
[33]. It is designed for privacy-concerning scenarios where lo-
cal nodes would not like to upload and share their private data.
Federated Learning is quite different from another impressive
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technique called distributed machine learning [34]. Distributed
machine learning is adopted to deal with the massive data
set and partition subsets of data to many nodes. Nowadays,
plenty of studies focus on federated learning. Kairou et. al.
summarized 438 papers and presented recent advances and
open problems in the field of federated learning [35].
Many papers concentrate on the performance improvement
of federated learning [36], [37]. In [14], Sattler proposed the
sparse ternary compression scheme for non-IID data. Zhao
also focused on the non-IID data and presented a method of
sharing a small subset of data between all the edge nodes to
improve the accuracy of federated learning [13]. For Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD), Wang presented and analyzed the
cooperative SGD method, and provided convergence guaran-
tees for the existing algorithms [15]. In [10], Yu provided
theoretical studies on the comparison of model averaging and
mini-batch SGD. Nishio studied the node selection problem
with resource constraints and provided a heuristic algorithm
to find qualified nodes [24]. This paper is a little similar to
our work, but Nishio neglects the incentive mechanism, which
is quite significant for MEC systems.
Both security and privacy are important concerns for fed-
erated learning [27]. Bonawitz proposed a secure global ag-
gregation algorithm that allows the server to compute without
learning each user’s contribution [17]. Impressively, Wang ex-
plored the user-level privacy leakage against federated learning
by attacks from malicious servers, and proposed a framework
with GAN to discriminate category and client identity of
input samples [21]. For the local privacy, Bhowmick designed
an optimal locally differentially private scheme for statistical
learning problems [20]. In [19], Preuveneers considered at-
tacks from local models with malicious training samples and
provided a chained anomaly detection method for federated
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learning. In [18], Bagdasaryan identified that participators can
inject hidden backdoors into the global model and proposed a
new model poisoning methodology with model replacement.
All these studies assume that edge nodes voluntarily partici-
pate in federated learning, without requiring any returns, which
does not hold in the realistic scenario of MEC. They neglect
the incentive issue of federated learning, except for the work
in [23]. Kang utilized the contract theory to motivate nodes to
participate in federated training in mobile networks [23]. Kang
and we almost simultaneously discover the significance of the
incentive issue. However, there exist some main differences:
(1) Kang considers the incentive problem in the monopoly
market, where mobile terminals can only decide whether to
accept the contracts or not. The efficiency of Kang’s scheme
is decided by the total number of contracts. In our scheme,
edge nodes have more opportunities to submit any combina-
tion of resources and the expected payment, and the buyer
“aggregator” can choose any node with qualified resources.
(2) In Kang’s scheme, the computational cost of calculating
the optimal contracts is NP-hard, while edge nodes only need
linear time to get the optimal strategy in FMore. (3) Node
selection is not provided in [23], while we not only motivate
more high-quality edge nodes to participate in the training but
also select those suitable nodes with low costs.
C. Procurement Auction
The incentive schemes with procurement auction are de-
signed to address varieties of problems, such as the allocation
of radio-frequency spectrum [26], crowdsensing [22], display
advertising [38], and client-assisted cloud storage systems
[39], [40]. Unfortunately, none of them can be directly applied
to federated learning in MEC, since they just considered
the specific property in their problems. In MEC, resources
provided by edge nodes are multi-dimensional and dynamic,
and K winners are selected in each game. In addition, the
proposed scheme should be lightweight and able to improve
the performance of federated learning with well-chosen nodes.
Consequently, we need to design a novel incentive scheme for
federated learning in MEC.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the incentive mechanism
for federated learning in MEC and proposed a lightweight and
efficient scheme FMore. FMore adopts the multi-dimensional
procurement auction with K winners. In FMore, edge nodes
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can obtain the Nash equilibrium strategy from our theoretical
results in linear computation time. We also provide guidance
to the aggregator to get the expected resources. We develop a
simulator with two models and four datasets to demonstrate the
advantages of FMore. Extensive simulations show that FMore
can reduce the training rounds by almost 51.3% and improve
the accuracy by 28% for the LSTM model. We also implement
a real-world system with 32 nodes in a Linux HPC cluster, and
find that the training time is reduced by 38.4% while model
accuracy is increased by 44.9%. In this paper, the budget
constraint of the aggregator is not considered, which is left
for future work. In addition, whether the probability ψ should
be identical or distinct for each node remains to be studied.
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APPENDIX
A. The proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since all the nodes have the same private cost param-
eter θ, we can find that their scores are identical, according
to Che’s Theorem 1 and Theorem 1. Since we must select K
nodes from N nodes, and each node is being selected with
the same probability, then it will be put in the set W with
probability KN , which is not related with probability ψ.
B. The proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose that an edge node has a Nash equilibrium
strategy (q1, · · · , qm, p), which means the expected utility
is maximized by this bidding strategy. In the following,
we will obtain the contradiction that there exists an alter-
native strategy (qs1, · · · , qsm, pˆ), where (qs1, · · · , qsm) =
argmax s(qs1, · · · , qsm) − c(qs1, · · · , qsm, θ) and pˆ = p +
s(qs1, · · · , qsm) − s(q1, · · · , qm), and it dominates the Nash
equilibrium strategy (q1, · · · , qm, p). We first find that these
two strategies have the same scores, i.e., S(qs1, · · · , qsm, pˆ) =
S(q1, · · · , qm, p). This can be easily proved by substituting pˆ
with p+s(qs1, · · · , qsm)−s(q1, · · · , qm) in the score function.
Then, we can have pi(qs1, · · · , qsm, pˆ) ≥ pi(q1, · · · , qm, p),
and get the expected contradiction. This demonstrates that
the qualities could be chosen with the optimization problem
argmax s(qs1, · · · , qsm)− c(qs1, · · · , qsm, θ).
C. The proof of Proposition 4
Proof. According to the expected utility theory, the aggregator
needs to solve the following optimization problem with the
cost constraint:
max s(·) =
m∏
i=1
qαii
s.t.
m∑
i=1
β˜iqiθ = c0
where β˜i is the estimation of coefficients for qi and c0 is the
budget. We use the Lagrange multiplier method to compute
the above problem and have
L = s(q1, · · · , qm)− λ(θ(
m∑
i=1
β˜iqi)− c0)
Then, we can get
∂L
∂qi
=
αi
∏m
i=1 q
αi
i
qi
− θλβ˜i = 0
Thus, we can easily obtain the conclusion
q∗i
q∗j
=
αi
αj
· β˜j
β˜i
,
where q∗i and q
∗
j are the optimal choices for the aggregator.
